The Hoodie-and-Tattoo Combo

There was a time, not so long ago in the grand scheme of things, when leaving the house required a modest amount of effort. You put on actual clothes. Pants with a zipper. A shirt that buttoned. Shoes that were not primarily designed for running from imaginary bears. You looked, if not sharp, at least intentional.

That era is over. We have entered the age of the hoodie, and the hoodie has won completely.

Look around. At the grocery store, the airport, the doctor’s office, the “casual Friday” that somehow became every day of the week. A significant percentage of the adult population is now wrapped in what amounts to a soft, slightly shapeless rectangle with a hood and a pouch in the front for their hands or their phone or their vague sense of unease. They are not dressed. They are contained.

Hoodies look like a bris gone wrong. A flap of skin still dangles, ready to envelope the head of its wearer to its pristine condition like a peek-a-boo circumcision.

And don’t get me started on the penchant of some Europeans to wrap their heads in massive shawls in winter so it looks like their heads are protruding from a birth canal.

But I digress. Back to hoodies and tattoos.

The hoodie is the official uniform of “I could not be bothered.” It is the sartorial equivalent of answering the door in your bathrobe and then deciding the bathrobe is fine for the rest of the day. It signals, with impressive efficiency, that the wearer has chosen comfort as their highest value and everything else can go hang.

We are told this is progress. Comfort is good. Self-expression is good. Judging people for how they look is bad. All true, up to a point. But somewhere along the way, “don’t judge” quietly turned into “don’t try.” The hoodie did not just become acceptable. It became the default. And once the default is a garment that looks like it was designed for people recovering from minor surgery, the entire idea of looking presentable starts to feel optional, then slightly suspicious, then faintly oppressive.

Notice how thoroughly it has leveled the field. The tech billionaire, the college student, the middle manager on a “work from home” day that somehow includes a trip to Costco, and the person buying lottery tickets at 11 a.m. all look roughly the same. Democracy has finally arrived in the closet. No one looks particularly good, but at least no one looks better than anyone else. Equality through mild dishevelment.

There is also the emotional dimension, which people will admit if you press them. The hoodie is not just warm. It is a portable cave. Pull the hood up and the world becomes a little less bright, a little less demanding, a little more optional. It is an emotional support garment for a population that finds ordinary public life mildly overstimulating. Fair enough. But when half the people in the coffee shop look like they are bracing for impact, one begins to wonder whether the problem is the world or the clothes.

Even the expensive versions do not really solve anything. A three-hundred-dollar hoodie is still, at the end of the day, a sweatshirt with better branding. It is the clothing equivalent of putting a luxury badge on a very comfortable recliner and calling it furniture. You have not elevated the form. You have simply made the surrender more exclusive.

Walk through any public place and the pattern repeats. Oversized hoodie, joggers or faded jeans, practical shoes. And then, rising from the collar or spilling out of a sleeve, a dense collection of ink: flowers, snakes, geometric patterns, names, dates, symbols whose meaning is known only to the wearer and perhaps a tattoo artist who has since moved to another city. The body has become the place where personality is now required to live, because the clothes have largely abdicated the job.

The theory is simple enough. Once clothing stopped carrying much information about the person inside it, something else had to pick up the slack. The hoodie says almost nothing. It is warm, it is convenient, and it does not ask the wearer to make many decisions. In that vacuum, tattoos have stepped forward as the primary method of visual self-assertion. If the outfit refuses to declare who you are, the skin will do it instead, and permanently.

This creates a distinctive modern silhouette: the carefully nonchalant top half paired with arms, necks, and hands that have been heavily annotated. It is as if the culture decided that effort was acceptable, but only if it could not be washed or changed with the seasons. Clothes can be soft and temporary. Identity, it seems, must be carved in.

The range of execution only sharpens the comedy. Some of the work is genuinely skilled — intricate, well-placed, the product of real craft. Much of it is not. There are impulse pieces acquired on a long weekend, names that no longer apply, symbols whose significance has quietly expired, designs that look as though they were chosen from a binder in a shopping-mall studio under fluorescent light, and botched tattoos that need explaining over and over again. The permanent nature of the medium does not appear to have inspired corresponding permanence of judgment. People will deliberate for weeks over a new phone but then make lifelong commitments of large portions of their bodies or faces to a decision made between lunch and dinner or strolling at the mall.

Location has also relaxed its former rules. What was once the domain of sailors, convicts, and people with very specific subcultural commitments has become general real estate. Hands, fingers, necks, and the occasional face now carry ink with the same casualness once reserved for a new pair of sneakers. The old warning that certain placements would limit employment options has been answered by a culture that increasingly does not care what you look like when you show up, as long as you show up in something soft.

There is a quiet logic to it. When the clothes have been reduced to a kind of social camouflage — comfortable, neutral, hard to criticize — the desire to be seen as distinctive does not disappear. It simply migrates. The hoodie announces that you are not competing on the traditional field of dress. The tattoos announce that you are still competing, just on a different and more permanent scoreboard.

A modern Descartes might say:”I am tattooed, therefore I am” instead of his original “I think, therefore I am”

The result is a strange new uniformity. Large numbers of people now present the same basic combination: soft, low-effort clothing wrapped around bodies that have been extensively customized. Individuality has not vanished. It has been outsourced from the closet to the skin, where it can no longer be changed with the weather or the decade.

One can almost admire the efficiency. Why bother with the daily negotiation of shirts and jackets when you can make a series of irreversible decisions in your twenties and thirties and then spend the rest of your life in fleece? The clothes stay easy. The statements stay fixed. And the rest of us are left to observe the spectacle of a culture that has decided looking like you just woke up is fine, as long as the waking-up is accompanied by permanent illustration.

We have become cartoon versions of The Illustrated Man and Lydia, the Tattooed Lady wrapped in potato sacks.

No Sex Please, We’re the 21st Century

Something unusual has happened in the bedrooms and living rooms of the developed world. Younger adults are having less sex than previous generations did at the same age. Partnerships form later, if at all. Birth rates have fallen in parallel, settling well below replacement in the United States and across most high-income countries. These trends are not rumors or moral panics. They show up consistently in large, repeated surveys. Understanding them requires looking at the data first, then at the overlapping forces that appear to be driving the change.

The Evidence on Sexual Activity

The numbers are unambiguous. In the U.S. General Social Survey, the share of 18- to 29-year-olds who reported having no sex in the past year roughly doubled between 2010 and 2024, rising from around 12 percent to 24 percent. Weekly sexual activity among adults aged 18–64 dropped from 55 percent in 1990 to 37 percent in recent years. National Survey of Family Growth data focused on adults in their twenties and early thirties show even sharper shifts: male virginity rose from 4 percent to 10 percent, and the share of young men reporting no sex in the previous year climbed from 9 percent to 24 percent. Young women experienced smaller but still clear increases in sexlessness.

Similar patterns appear in other wealthy countries. The decline is steeper among young men than young women and accelerated after smartphones became ubiquitous, with a further drop during the pandemic years. Partnered adults continue to have substantially more sex than singles. As the share of young adults living with a romantic partner has fallen, overall sexual frequency has declined with it. Marriage, which remains the strongest predictor of regular sexual activity, is occurring later or not at all for a growing portion of the cohort.

At the same time, mainstream film and television have grown noticeably tamer. Analyses of top-grossing movies show roughly 40 percent less sexual content since 2000, with a large rise in films containing no sex scenes at all. Nudity on prestige television has also declined. Part of this reflects commercial realities—global markets, franchise filmmaking, and the fact that free online pornography has made on-screen sex less novel. Part of it also tracks audience preferences, particularly among younger viewers who often say they prefer less emphasis on sex and more on plot or friendship.

What Appears to Be Driving the Decline

No single explanation accounts for the full pattern. Several forces have converged and reinforced one another.

Technology and attention. Smartphones and social media have reshaped daily life. Young adults spend far fewer hours in unstructured face-to-face socializing than earlier cohorts did. Social time with friends has roughly halved. Pornography offers reliable, low-effort, rejection-free sexual release. For a non-trivial share of young men, this appears to reduce the urgency of pursuing real-world partners. Social media also fuels constant comparison and body-image anxiety, which can dampen desire and confidence. Real sex requires vulnerability, coordination, and time offline—qualities that compete poorly with an always-available screen.

Economics and delayed adulthood. Housing costs, student debt, and uncertain early-career prospects keep more young adults living with parents longer. Forming an independent household—the practical precondition for most sexual relationships—has become harder. Dating itself carries higher costs than in previous decades. Economic pressure does not make the physical act expensive, but it raises the logistical barriers to the relationships in which sex most reliably occurs.

Cultural and relational friction. The post-#MeToo emphasis on consent improved protections against genuine misconduct. It also increased caution. Many young men report greater hesitation to approach women in person for fear of missteps, public shaming, or false accusations. Dating apps became the safer default, yet they often produce less successful real-world pairing than older forms of courtship. Political and cultural polarization between young men and young women has widened, reducing the pool of compatible partners. Rising identification with non-heterosexual identities, especially bisexuality among young women, has occurred alongside the broader decline. The available evidence does not support the claim that this identity shift is the primary driver of overall sexlessness; the drop is most pronounced in heterosexual pairings, and some data suggest higher partnered activity among bisexual-identifying young people. Still, the cultural climate around sex and gender has grown more charged and anxious for many.

Changing priorities. Newer cohorts place heavier weight on education, career, personal autonomy, and intensive standards of parenting. Parenthood feels more optional and more demanding. When fewer peers are having children, the social expectation weakens further. Alcohol use among young adults has also declined, removing a traditional social lubricant that once lowered inhibitions and facilitated meeting people.

These factors interact. Less in-person socializing reduces opportunities. Economic pressure delays independence. Cultural caution raises the perceived cost of initiation. Technology supplies substitutes. The result is fewer relationships and less sex within the relationships that do form.

The Link to Low Birth Rates

The connection to fertility is direct. Fewer partnerships and less frequent partnered sex reduce both intended and unintended pregnancies. U.S. total fertility has settled near 1.6 children per woman—well below the replacement level of approximately 2.1. The general fertility rate (births per 1,000 women ages 15–44) has reached successive record lows, and provisional data show the decline continuing. Teen birth rates keep setting new lows. Parallel patterns hold across most high-income countries.

Marriage remains a strong predictor of higher fertility. As marriage and stable cohabitation have declined among young adults, births have followed. The drop is not simply delayed childbearing that will be made up later; first-birth rates have fallen across most age groups, and completed fertility for recent cohorts is tracking lower. Economic uncertainty, high housing and childcare costs, longer education, and shifting life priorities all contribute. But the upstream decline in sexual and romantic pairing is a necessary part of the story. Societies cannot have many children if large numbers of young adults are not forming the relationships in which children are usually conceived.

Looking Ahead

The sex recession and the birth drought are real, measurable, and multi-causal. Treating them as the fault of any single ideology or movement oversimplifies the evidence. Technology, economics, delayed adulthood, changing norms around risk and consent, and evolving life priorities all play substantial roles. Political polarization between the sexes adds further friction. None of this requires nostalgia for earlier eras of higher risk or lower agency. Reliable contraception, expanded opportunities for women, and clearer standards of consent are genuine gains. Yet the data show that ordinary partnership formation has become more difficult for many young people, with consequences that extend well beyond private life into demography, labor markets, and the long-term shape of societies.

Understanding the pattern clearly is the necessary first step. Whether and how societies respond—through housing policy, cultural signaling, technological design, or something else—remains an open question. What is no longer open is whether the change is happening.

Sex used to be fun. Take it from a baby boomer: sex was really fun when I was young. We had sex often and with great gusto.

Today, sex seems to be trapped in a sociological mine field with enormous amounts of internet porn splashed over everything.

My conclusion is that we would all be better off if we had more regular clean, healthy, simple, and fun sex in respectful relationships.

Lawrence of Arabia’s Country Cottage

After the deserts, the campaigns, and the unwanted fame, T. E. Lawrence wanted something small, quiet, and completely under his control. In 1923, while stationed with the Tank Corps at Bovington Camp in Dorset, he found a half-ruined labourer’s cottage on the edge of the heath. He later described it as a “pathetic little shoddy place.” The roof leaked, the windows were gone, and it had stood empty for years.

Over the next decade he slowly transformed it. He made it watertight, added bookshelves, a music room, a bath, and a few carefully chosen pieces of furniture. He kept it deliberately sparse — no electricity, almost no kitchen, and guests slept in sleeping bags on the floor. What mattered to him was privacy, books, gramophone records, and the surrounding stretch of rhododendron and heath. He called it an earthly paradise.

Clouds Hill became the place where the public figure known as Lawrence of Arabia could disappear into the private man. Friends such as Thomas Hardy, E. M. Forster, and George Bernard Shaw visited. He worked on his writing there, listened to music, and maintained the Brough Superior motorcycle that would eventually kill him just a short distance from the cottage in 1935.

Today the National Trust looks after the house much as he left it. The Country Life article traces how this unlikely English sanctuary — once dismissed as shoddy and insignificant — became one of the most personal and revealing monuments to a complicated life.

Can America Still Out-Innovate China?

An Asia Times piece recently argued that the U.S. is unlikely to keep outpacing Chinese innovation. Looking at the evidence, it’s hard to say they’re completely wrong.

For years, American experts predicted China would stay stuck as a copycat because it lacked free markets, strong patent protection, and democratic debate. Those predictions aged poorly. China now leads or is highly competitive in electric vehicles, batteries, drones, solar, 5G hardware, and industrial robotics. It didn’t get there by copying Silicon Valley. It got there by treating manufacturing itself as the main engine of innovation and by using the state as a big coordinator rather than just a referee.

America still does some things better. We lead in the most advanced AI models, chip design, software platforms, and venture capital. The biggest breakthroughs in frontier AI still tend to come from U.S. labs. That edge is real.

But the old phrase “Designed in Cupertino, manufactured in China” still captures the problem. The U.S. is excellent at inventing and designing. China is excellent at the harder, less glamorous work of turning those designs into refined, affordable products at massive scale. When most of the actual making happens elsewhere, you lose the daily learning that comes from production. China never stopped treating that learning as valuable.

That loss of manufacturing depth is now showing up in national security. The U.S. struggles to build its own navy ships on time and in meaningful numbers, while China turns them out faster and in far greater quantity. A country that cannot produce the physical tools of power at scale eventually finds its strategic options limited, no matter how advanced its software or designs are.

Part of the difference also comes from how the two governments are built. China’s senior leadership has long included a high share of people with engineering and technical backgrounds, and the system allows for longer stretches of policy continuity. Once they decide something is strategic, they can keep pushing for years. U.S. politics is dominated by lawyers and business people who change with every election cycle. Priorities shift, funding gets interrupted, and long-term industrial efforts are harder to sustain.

American innovation is also heavily shaped by what capital markets will fund in the short term. China can stick with strategic technologies for years even when the quarterly numbers look bad. That patience has paid off in several key industries.

Does this mean America is doomed to fall behind? Not necessarily. We still have big advantages in talent, basic research, and the ability to attract ambitious people from everywhere. But those advantages erode if we keep treating manufacturing as someone else’s problem, if regulation and energy costs keep making it hard to build things at scale here, and if political turnover keeps interrupting any attempt at sustained industrial strategy.

The article’s core point holds up better than the old “China can’t innovate” consensus did: different systems produce different kinds of innovation. Right now, China’s system is better at turning technology into widespread, practical dominance in a growing number of fields. America’s system is still better at the very frontier of certain technologies.

The open question is whether leading at the frontier is enough if the other side keeps winning the race to deploy and scale. Looking at batteries, EVs, drones, industrial robots, and now even naval shipbuilding, the answer so far has not been encouraging for the U.S. The Cupertino half of the equation is still strong. The manufacturing and long-term coordination half is the part that keeps slipping.

AI Got Really Smart… and Almost Nothing Changed

AI just solved a math problem that humans couldn’t crack for 87 years. It also figured out some tough quantum crypto stuff. The best mathematicians on the planet are now using AI to help them understand the answers.

This is the worst AI will ever be at this kind of thing. It’s only going to get better.

And yet… look around. Daily life is pretty much the same. People still drive to work, sit at computers, scroll their phones, and collect paychecks. Jobs haven’t disappeared in some massive wave. The economy is growing okay, but not exploding.

A lot of smart people expected the world to transform the second machines got smarter than us. Sci-fi always shows an “intelligence explosion” where AI becomes god-like overnight and rewrites reality. That didn’t happen.

Some folks are starting to wonder if intelligence itself has limits — like there’s only so smart you can get before extra brainpower stops helping much. Making an AI smarter might be less like building a taller tower and more like polishing a ball that’s already pretty round. At some point the gains get smaller.

Even if pure brainpower has a ceiling, AI can still change a lot of things for three practical reasons:

1. You can make more of it.
Humans are limited by birth rates. AI isn’t. You can just build more data centers and more robots. Suddenly one person can have a whole army of smart machines helping them.

2. It can notice the tiny stuff humans miss.
A lot of valuable know-how in companies is just a bunch of little tricks workers do without even realizing it. AI that watches everything can spot those tricks, test improvements fast, and spread them. That alone could speed up how quickly average companies catch up to the best ones.

3. It can handle messy patterns we can’t.
Some things in the world are too complicated for any single human brain (or even a group of them) to fully grasp. AI might still be able to use those patterns usefully even if we never really understand them.

So the big payoff from AI may not come from it being a genius that outthinks every human. It may come from pairing human-style thinking with the things computers already do better: speed, perfect memory, and handling huge amounts of data without getting tired.

The intelligence explosion already happened. It just didn’t look like the movies.

Bring In ’Da Data, Bring In ’Da Noise

There is a clear imbalance in the research literature about data centers and noise pollution. Electricity use (and associated emissions) and water consumption of data centers have been the subject of many peer-reviewed papers, reviews, life-cycle assessments, and quantitative modeling studies for years. These cover power demand growth (especially from AI), carbon footprints, water-use intensity (direct cooling + indirect grid water), efficiency metrics like PUE/WUE, regional variations, and projections under different cooling technologies or grid mixes.

By contrast, peer-reviewed work specifically on community noise impacts from data centers (the continuous low-frequency hum from cooling systems, transformers, etc., and effects on nearby residents) is sparse. What exists is mostly:

  • Engineering/acoustic modeling papers and conference proceedings (noise source characterization, propagation modeling, mitigation strategies for cooling equipment and generators).
  • Occupational studies measuring high internal noise levels (often >85 dBA) for workers inside facilities.
  • Exploratory health assessments, grey literature, government reviews (e.g., Virginia’s JLARC), and media/community reports of complaints about sleep disturbance, annoyance, and low-frequency effects.
  • Analogies drawn from the broader environmental noise literature (sleep disruption, stress, cardiovascular risks from chronic noise).

Direct epidemiological studies linking data-center noise exposure to measured health outcomes in surrounding communities remain limited or largely absent. Multiple recent papers and reviews explicitly note this research gap: direct evidence on health impacts of data centers (including noise) is sparse, most work relies on indirect analogy or modeling, and empirical community-level studies are urgently needed as facilities proliferate.

Public debate, local complaints, lawsuits, and media coverage about the “constant low-frequency hum” have indeed intensified with the AI data-center boom, often outpacing the formal peer-reviewed science on health effects. Noise levels at property lines are frequently reported in the 40–60+ dB range (sometimes higher during generator testing), which can be noticeable especially at night, but rigorous quantification of population-level health consequences specific to these sources is still catching up.

Contact your local Member of Congress or other politicians and ask that they address this problem.

Here are some scientific papers addressing this issue.

Global data center expansion and human health: A call for empirical research

Understanding the impact of data center noise pollution

Noise Exposure Assessment in the Occupational Environment of Air-Cooled Data Centers